New Forms of Revolt by Kristeva, Julia
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXII, No 2 (2014)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2014.650 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No 
Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 
 
This journal is operated by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh 
as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is co-sponsored by the 
University of Pittsburgh Press 
  
New Forms of Revolt 
Julia Kristeva 
 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy - Revue de la philosophie 
française et de langue française, Vol XXII, No 2 (2014) pp 1-19 
 
Vol XXII, No 2 (2014) 
ISSN 1936-6280 (print) 
ISSN 2155-1162 (online) 
DOI 10.5195/jffp.2014.650 
www.jffp.org 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXII, No 2 (2014)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2014.650 
New Forms of Revolt 
Julia Kristeva 
Université Paris Diderot – Paris 7 
 
An Inner Experience 
Popular uprisings, indignant youth, toppled dictators, oligarchic 
presidents dismissed, hopes dashed, liberties crushed in prisons, fixed trials, 
and bloodbaths. How are we to read these images? Could revolt, or what is 
called “riot” on the Web, be waking humanity from its dream of 
hyperconnectedness? Or could it just be a trick played on us so that the 
culture of spectacle can last longer? But what “revolt” are we talking about? 
Is it even possible, in these times of widespread misery, endemic debt, 
austerity and unemployment, when local wars can turn into global ones and 
when the melting of the icecaps is ready to flood us? 
I wrote L’Avenir d’une révolte (1998), translated as The Future of Revolt in 
2002, shortly after The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt (1996) and Intimate Revolt 
(1997), about fifteen years ago.1 France remains proud of its memory and its 
exceptional culture, but it is also increasingly disappointed by the plans and 
promises of politics and it is becoming absentionist in an aging Europe. But 
France remains animated by an unquenchable thirst for the freedom of 
thought, which is expressed in the brilliance of the French language and the 
passion for Republican debate.  
I was listening then and am still listening now to my analysands: 
regardless of their gender, these people are experiencing a personal crisis or 
a crisis plain and simple, and they are opening up — in well-worn words —
their eternal return and maybe their rebirth. A new type of angry person has 
taken up the path of intimate revolt. They are the new realists who, as we 
used to say in May 1968, want the impossible. Their revolt appears to me as 
the visible side of a reassessment of the religious domain, which is called 
inner experience. This inner experience continues to assert itself timidly, 
secretly but yet distinctly below the surface of images, elements of language 
and tensions of identity. It is this revolt, which goes against the tide of the 
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oppression and fear of unsolvable crisis as well as idealistic enchantment, 
that I examine in the following pages, which have been translated in 
numerous languages. Their meaning now comes back to me like an echo 
sent back by new, unsuspected readers. 
I am thinking, for instance, of an American researcher who was 
analyzing the traps and benefits of political bipartisanship and who turned 
to European or so-called “Continental” philosophy in order to inquire into 
“values” rather than exploring data. I am thinking of a Chinese lawyer and a 
Chinese artist who were awarded the Simone de Beauvoir Award for 
women’s freedom. While partaking in the economic rise of China, they are 
also running the risk of rebelling and are demanding the application of 
“women’s rights”, at a time when human rights are still not being widely 
recognised. I am also thinking of the democrats who took part in the “Arab 
Spring,” before the return of the defeated Islamic fundamentalists. I am 
thinking of the Chilean student who waved a Spanish translation of my 
writings on revolt outside his institution, which was on strike, and who 
displayed a poster that read “The University in Revolt,” in response to 
drastic funding cuts in education. Finally, I am thinking of the Syrian 
psychoanalysts who are attempting an astonishing transvaluation of their 
tradition. They are resisting dictatorship by creating “group psychotherapies 
against fear”- and they are refining their translations of Freud’s writings, 
borrowing from the lexicon of Arab mysticism.  
This new species of rebels (revoltés) are enraged, but they have not lost 
the decisive and specific meaning of revolt. Each and every one of them is 
involved in a difficult and often tiresome life and carries out a risky struggle. 
Yet, they do share something new, something that has perhaps been there all 
the while, but that can now be confessed to and even redeemed. They are 
discovering through their experiences that there is no answer to social, 
historic and political impasses without a radical inner experience; an inner 
experience that is demanding, unique, and able to appropriate the 
complexity of the past in order to approach the present and the future. 
This inner experience is meant to escape the shortsightedness of the 
technicians of political governance, to fight against the fundamentalism that 
seeks to eliminate corruption but starts by repressing fundamental liberties. 
This inner experience is also meant to avoid the nonsensical and vengeful 
rejection, which is both symmetrical and powerless, that denounces one’s 
opponent without being able to propose a sensible alternative. It is not 
enough to have a plan. It is necessary to have men and women with inner 
experiences that are unique, inquisitive, and uncompromising. It is on this 
condition alone that they can be reformers. It is necessary to have men and 
women who know how to pass on and share a language of revolt. It is only 
at this price that they can be innovative. 
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Poetry has always been able to proclaim the desire for free will, by 
restoring words to memory and thereby extracting a sense of time. In those 
eras that are vaguely felt to be in decline or at least in a state of suspension, 
questioning remains the only possible thought: it is an indication of a life 
that is simply living. Intimacy is not the new prison. Its need for connection 
might, one day, initiate another politics. Today, mental life knows that it will 
only be saved if it gives itself the time and space of revolt: to break, to 
remember, to re-do. From prayer to dialogue, through art and analysis, the 
crucial event is always the great infinitesimal emancipation: to recommence 
endlessly. Without it, all that globalization would have to do is to calculate 
growth rates and genetic probabilities. Truths, including scientific ones, may 
well be illusions, but they have the future in front of them. In contrast with 
certainties and beliefs, permanent revolt is this questioning of the self, of 
everything and of nothingness, which no longer seems to have any place to 
occur. Be that as it may, if there is still time, let us wager on the future of 
revolt. As Albert Camus said, “I revolt, therefore we are.” Or rather: “I 
revolt, therefore we are to come.” This is an enlightening and long-lasting 
experience. 
What Revolt Today? 
For at least two centuries, the word “revolt”, with its rich and complex 
etymology, has had a political meaning.2 Today we understand revolt as a 
challenge to pre-established norms, values, and powers. Ever since the 
French Revolution, “political revolt” has been the secular version of the 
negativity that is characteristic of the life of conscience when it attempts to 
remain faithful to its internal logic. A synonym of dignity, revolt is our 
mysticism. 
But we are increasingly aware that what is called the “new world 
order” — whose democratic advantages no longer need to be praised, 
despite its risks and even its dead-ends in the East — is not propitious to this 
revolt. Against whom does one revolt if power and values are vacant or cor-
rupt? Or, even more seriously, who can revolt if one is increasingly reduced 
to a conglomerate of organs, if one is no longer a “subject” but a 
“patrimonial person”, endowed not only with a financial patrimony but also 
a genetic or physiological, free at best only to channel-surf? If I exaggerate 
and simplify the present state of affairs, it is only to better highlight what we 
all perceive. It is not only the case that political revolt has become entangled 
in trade-offs between parties, whose ideological differences are less and less 
obvious to us; an essential ingredient of European culture — a culture 
fashioned by doubt and critique — is losing its moral and aesthetic 
significance. When it exists, it is marginalized as an ornamental alibi 
tolerated by the society of the spectacle, when it is not simply engulfed and 
made impossible by “entertainment culture,” “performance culture,” and 
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“show-business culture” (culture-show). The use of Anglicisms here conveys 
the dynamics at work.  
At the risk of aggravating my image as someone who willingly depicts 
and even enjoys exaggerating the seriousness of the present state of affairs, I 
would like to discuss some aspects of my novel, Possessions. Against the 
backdrop of a detective story, the body of a beheaded woman is discovered: 
she was Gloria Harrison, a translator by profession and the mother of a 
difficult child. The reader discovers that not one but several characters are in 
fact responsible for the murder, before the final beheading happened. I put a 
lot of myself into this depiction of female and maternal suffering that sums 
up the difficulty of being a woman. I am the beheaded woman. I am also the 
female investigator in charge, alongside detective superintendant, Northrop 
Rilsky. Another woman, Stephanie Delacour, is a journalist from Paris. It is 
still possible to carry out an investigation in the virtual, Mafia-dominated 
world that is Santa Barbara. “You can know”: that is basically what the 
reader of detective novels is told. Indeed, in this popular genre the 
possibility to question remains alive. Could that be the reason why, though 
people no longer read, they still read detective novels: is the zero degree of 
questioning’s aptitude for judgment our only remaining safeguard against 
the “banality of evil”? To my mind, Possessions, among many other novels, is 
a humble form of revolt. But are other, higher forms of revolt, really any 
more effective? 
Furthermore, the female world allows me to suggest an alternative to a 
robotizing and spectacular society that damages the culture of revolt: this 
alternative is, quite simply, sensible intimacy. Possessing their passions and 
sensibilities, some human beings nonetheless continue to ask themselves 
questions. I am convinced that, after all the more or less promising projects 
and slogans that were launched by feminist movements in the seventies, the 
arrival of women on the front of the moral and social stage will have the 
effect of revalorizing sensible experience, as an antidote to technical 
calculation. The immense responsibility of women for the survival of the 
species — how can we preserve the freedom of our bodies while at the same 
time ensuring that the best conditions are provided for the lives of our 
children? — goes hand in hand with this rehabilitation of the sensible. The 
novel is the privileged terrain for such an exploration and for its com-
munication to the greatest number. Alongside and in addition to the culture 
of the image — its seduction, its swiftness, its brutality, and its easy 
accessibility — the culture of words, the narrative and the place it reserves 
for meditation, seems to me to be a type of minimal revolt. It may not be 
very much, but are you sure that we have not reached a point of no return, 
from which we will have to return to the little things — infinitesimal revolts 
— in order to preserve the life of the mind and of the species? 
Revolt, then, as return/turning back/displacement/change, constitutes 
the internal logic of a certain culture that I would like to revive here and 
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whose acuity seems quite threatened these days.  But let us return once 
again to the meaning of this revolt, which seems to me to indicate what is 
most alive and promising about our culture.  
Similarities and Differences with the “Retrospective 
Return”     
Ever since Socrates and Plato and even more explicitly so in Christian 
theology, humans have been invited to “return”. Some of you may still 
retain a trace of this, if not the practice. This is notably the aim of Saint 
Augustine’s repetition, which is based on the retrospective link to the 
Creator’s already-there: the possibility of questioning one’s own being, 
searching for oneself (se quaerere: ‘quaesto mihi factus sum’), is offered by this 
aptitude to “re-turn”, which is also simultaneously recollection, 
interrogation, and thought. 
Yet technological development has favored the knowledge of stable 
values, to the detriment of thought as return and as search (as repetition, as 
se quaerere, “going in search of oneself”). Besides, the secularization of 
Christianity, as well as its own intrinsic tendencies toward stabilization and 
reconciliation in the immutability of being, have depreciated — when they 
have not invalidated or made impossible — this “struggle” with the world 
and with oneself that also characterizes Christian eschatology.  
Subsequently, the questioning of values turned into nihilism. By 
“nihilism,” I mean the rejection of old values in favour of a cult of new 
values that are unquestioned. What was taken as a “revolt” or a “revolu-
tion” for the past two centuries, particularly in politics and its accompanying 
ideologies, has most often been the abandonment of retrospective 
questioning in favour of an outright rejection of the old, so that new dogmas 
can take its place. 
Generally, when the media uses the word “revolt,” what is generally 
meant is nothing other than this nihilistic suspension of questioning in favor 
of so-called new values which, precisely as “values,” have forgotten to 
question themselves, and as a result, have essentially betrayed the meaning 
of the re-volt that I am trying to make you appreciate here. The nihilist is not 
a man in revolt, in the sense I defined the term in Sense and Non-Sense of 
Revolt and Intimate Revolt. The pseudo-rebellious nihilist is, in fact, someone 
who is reconciled by the stability of new values. And this stability, which is 
illusory, turns out to be deadly and totalitarian. I cannot stress enough the 
fact that totalitarianism is the result of a certain fixation of revolt precisely in 
terms of its betrayal, namely, the suspension of retrospective return, which 
amounts to a suspension of thought. Hannah Arendt has brilliantly 
developed this elsewhere.3  
I am therefore seeking experiences in which this work of revolt, which 
opens psychical life to infinite re-creation, continues and reoccurs, even at 
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the price of errors and dead-ends. Indeed, we should not delude ourselves: 
it is not enough to revive the permanence of revolt, which technology may 
have inhibited, in order to secure happiness or some sort of serene stability 
of being. Revolt exposes the speaking subject to an unbearable conflict, and 
our century has assumed the daunting privilege of manifesting the 
necessary enjoyment (jouissance) and the morbid dead-ends associated with 
that conflict. But this occurs in an altogether different way from the nihilist 
who is focused on the celebration of an unmitigated rejection of the “old” or 
on the unflinching positivity inspired by the “new.” 
So here we are: we can either renounce revolt by returning to “old 
values” or even “new” ones that do not look back on themselves and do not 
question themselves, or on the contrary, we can persevere and relentlessly 
recommence the retrospective return in order to go to the limits of the 
representable/the thinkable/the bearable: to the point of “possession.” 
These limits have been made evident by some advances of the culture of our 
century. 
We should note that the revolt of modern man is not a mere resumption 
of the retrospective link that is the basis of the inner space of the Christian 
man, who is reassured in his quest which is completed by a return to the 
summum esse. While sharing the path of retroactive questioning, modern 
man comes to an irreconcilable conflict. Although it may have been 
produced in the margins of art or the mysticism of the past, this conflict 
never reached the scope or paroxysm experienced in modernity. 
Just as the concept of “process” distinguishes modern history from that 
of antiquity, based on the destiny and genius of great men, the concept of 
“self-organization” is specific to contemporary history, which in our century 
moves from one crisis to the next. Similarly, I contend that the concept of 
man in revolt distinguishes the modern man from both the Christian man, 
reconciled with God (“coram Deo”), and the nihilist, who is his enraged but 
symmetrical opposite. 
Psychoanalysis as Revolt 
In what sense is revolt as we understand it — along with Freud, who 
points to the diabolical unconscious, and some contemporary writers who 
explore borderline cases of the psyche — distinguishable from the retro-
spective relationship of tendere esse with the “not yet” and the “no longer”? 
Let us venture an initial reply: revolt is distinguished by the particular fact 
that the tension toward unity, being, or the authority of the law (although 
still at work in the modern revolt) is accompanied more than ever by 
centrifugal forces of dissolution and dispersion. 
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Furthermore, this conflict leads to enjoyment (jouissance), which is not 
simply a narcissistic or egoistic whim of those who are spoiled by consumer 
society or the society of the spectacle. The jouissance at stake here – and this 
is where Freud demonstrates how radical he is– is indispensible to keeping 
the psyche alive; it is indispensible to the faculty of representation and to the 
questioning that is specific to human beings. In this sense, Freud’s discovery 
of the unconscious was the new Archimedean point — of the psyche as 
always already dependent on the Other and the other — that constituted the 
privileged location where life could find its meaning. This is possible if and 
only if the psyche is capable of revolt. It is even on this ground that Freud 
founded psychoanalysis as an invitation to anamnesis, with the aim of a 
rebirth, or in other words, a psychical restructuring. 
Through a narrative of free association and in the rejuvenating revolt 
with and against the old law (familial taboos, superego, ideals, Oedipal or 
narcissistic limits, etc.), one’s singular autonomy emerges, along with one’s 
renewed link to the other. But this other “Freudian palace of memory” that 
psychoanalysis revisits and transforms was not perceived by Hannah 
Arendt, who praised Saint Augustine’s palace of memory but dismissed 
psychology and psychoanalysis, which in her eyes were sciences of “the 
general.” 
 
Regaining the Sense of the Negative 
The modern age, which I will date from the French Revolution, for the 
sake of this argument, valued the negative part of this retrospective return. 
Personal or collective experience became an experience of conflict or of 
contradiction. Being itself is wrought by nothingness, philosophy essentially 
says, from Hegel to Heidegger and Sartre, although in different ways.  
This co-presence of nothingness with being takes a dialectical form in 
Hegel.  
Starting with his text What is Metaphysics? (1929), Heidegger makes a 
distinction between the negation internal to judgment and a nothingness 
that annihilates differently from the way thought does: it is in sensation and 
anxiety that the philosopher will seek the nuclear forms of what he calls a 
repulsion, which is a characteristic feature of the human as a reject, an 
outcast of being. Dasein is a repulsion; “ek-stasy” is another word for “ab-
jection.” Has this similarity been given as much thought as it deserves? 
In Being and Nothingness (1943), Sartre relies on this difference between 
the negation proper to thought and a primordial annihilation/nothingness. 
But rather than insisting on re-pulsion, he emphasizes freedom which 
ultimately makes him more Hegelian than Heideggerian, as much in his 
philosophy as in his political anarchism. 
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If I am re-reading these texts today and if I am asking you to read them 
again with me, it is because they bear witness to a unique moment in 
Western thought, the moment when the “retrospective return” – that is, the 
knowing subject’s questioning of himself and his truth – leads to nothing 
less than a familiarity with psychosis. There is an annihilating force (Kraft) 
behind the concept, whose disquieting movement (poussée) must be 
absorbed by the concept (Hegel), as well as the feeling of dissociation or 
repulsion in Heidegger and even Sartre’s “pre-judicative nothingness” that 
fuels his notion of freedom as radical violence and as a questioning of all 
identity, faith, and law. All these advances, when confronted with human 
realities to make their logic accessible, come up against a psychical reality 
that endangers consciousness and exposes it to the pulse of being. This fades 
away the borders between subject and object; it is an assault of the drives. 
Language becomes tonality (Stimmung), the memory of being, the music of 
the body and of matter. Heidegger seeks to capture this near psychosis, by 
respectfully visiting the work of Hölderlin. Sartre flees it by holding on to a 
totalizing and translucid consciousness, for whom Flaubert, “the family 
idiot”, and Genet, “actor and martyr” - in the neghborhood of melancholy 
and perversion, through style and play - offer a better hold on reason and 
humanism than the radical destruction performed by Artaud. 
It may be surprising to maintain that the psychoanalytic movement 
inaugurated by Freud belongs to this interrogation into nothingness and 
negativity. I am not talking about American psychoanalysis which is 
dominated by Ego psychology, but about Freud’s radical interrogation of the 
psyche that leads to the borders of biology and being. We find testimony of 
this in a still enigmatic text of 1925, Die Verneinung (Negation). For the first 
time in the history of thought, even a few years before Heidegger’s What Is 
Metaphysics?, Freud links the fate of two types of negation: the rejection 
proper to the drives (Ausstossung or Verwerfung) and the negativity internal 
to judgment. In substance, he maintains that the symbol and/or thought are 
a sort of negation, which itself is nothing but a transformation under certain 
conditions of rejection or of a disconnection proper to the drive, which is 
elsewhere called the “death drive”. 
We must now ask this question: under what conditions does the 
rejecting drive become symbolizing negation? All psychoanalytical research 
on the “paternal function” (Lacan) or the “good-enough mother” 
(Winnicott), to name just a couple of examples, seeks to answer this 
question. Melanie Klein bases the most original part of her work on the 
importance of this dissociating, rejecting drive, which occurs well before the 
appearance of the unity of the ego. This is what she calls the 
“schizoparanoid phase,” which precedes the “depressive phase” that 
generates symbolism and language. The work on narcissism, borderline 
personalities, and so on, probes deeper into this modality of the psyche, 
dependent on the archaic, the instinctive, the maternal, and, beyond that, the 
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extra-psychical to the point of biology or being (depending on the school of 
thought). 
These different currents of theoretical thought in philosophy and psy-
choanalysis have touched on this point: through retrospective questioning – 
that is, through inquiry or analysis – they have reached this border region of 
the speaking being that is psychosis. 
Parallel to philosophy and psychoanalysis, not by theoretical means but 
by those proper to language itself, the practice of writing can attain non-
sense too. By unfolding the meaning of sensations and drives, it can find its 
pulse in an order that is no longer “symbolic” but “semiotic.” I am thinking 
of the de-semanticization of style through ellipses in Mallarmé or through 
polyphony and portmanteau words in Joyce. Through language, and 
linguistic overcompetence, an apparent regression is obtained to an 
“infantile state of language.” The semiotic chora, this infra-linguistic 
musicality that all poetic language aims for, becomes the main objective of 
modern poetry, an “experimental psychosis.”4 What I mean by this, is that 
psychosis is the work of a subject, but a subject who is on trial. It is by 
returning to the archaeology of the subject’s unity, leading to the material of 
language and of thought itself, that the subject reaches the unsafe regions 
where this unity is annihilated. 
The Logical Paradoxes of Revolt 
Thoughts or writings in revolt attempt to find a representation (a 
language, a thought, a style) for this confrontation of the human with the 
unity or the limit of the law, being, and the self to which we accede in 
jouissance. As you know, jouissance is perceived by the old norms as an evil. 
Yet, insofar as jouissance is thought/written/represented, it is a passage 
through evil, and it is thereby perhaps the most profound way of avoiding 
the radical evil that results from the stoppage of representation and 
questioning. The permanence of contradiction, the temporariness of 
reconciliation, the bringing to the fore of everything that puts the very 
possibility of unified meaning to the test (such as the drives, the 
unnameable, the feminine, destruction, psychosis, etc.): this is what the 
culture of revolt explores. 
That is to say that it announces a veritable transformation of the human 
deriving from the Christian eschatology of retrospection as the path to truth 
and intimacy. One can then see that the Freudian discovery is not a rejection 
of this tradition but a deepening of it all the way to the limits of conscious 
unity. From that starting point, the Freudian path announces a possible 
transformation of our culture, inasmuch as it initiates another relationship to 
meaning and the One. 
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As you will have gathered, it is not so much in the world of action that 
this revolt is realized but rather in that of psychical life and its social man-
ifestations (writing, thought, art). This revolt seems to me to manifest the 
crises of modern man as much as its advances. Yet, as a transformation of 
man’s relationship to meaning, this cultural revolt intrinsically concerns the 
life of the city. It therefore has far-reaching political implications. In fact, it 
poses the question of another politics, one of permanent conflict. 
I am sure you are well aware of how psychoanalysis has been attacked, 
denigrated and marginalized lately. While it has been the object of resistance 
from the outset (inevitably, insofar as it collides with the human being’s 
desire not to know, the human being preferring sexual mystification to 
confronting truths that may place him in revolt), it seems the general 
suspicion surrounding analysis today can be explained by other causes. The 
conditions of modern life – with the prevalence of technology, image, speed, 
and so forth, all inducing stress and depression – tend to reduce psychical 
space and to abolish the faculty of representation. Psychical curiosity might 
be considered natural but turns out to be less and less natural; it yields 
before the demands of so-called efficiency. The unquestionable advances of 
the neurosciences are then ideologically valorized and championed as 
antidotes to psychical afflictions. Gradually, these afflictions are denied as 
such and reduced to their biological substrata, a neurological deficiency. 
A schematic materialism claims to do without the Freudian dualism 
that reserved a place for initiative, autonomy, and the desire of the subject. A 
diehard cognitivism subsumes within the same logic both the neuronal 
economy and the heteronomy of psychical representations. Ideological 
protests of a politically correct sort promote ethnic and sexual differences 
while refusing the rational approaches (psychoanalysis, among them) that 
allow a better grasp of their singularities. By denigrating what they call an 
analytical universalism, these currents shift from militancy to a sectarian 
logic. Finally, psychoanalytical societies themselves contribute to 
discrediting psychoanalysis, with their fearful politics and concern for 
safeguarding their clinical purity or, on the contrary, for their unduly 
aggressive ideological, if not spiritual, orientation. As a result, they 
undermine the “Copernican revolution” that Freud introduced in the 
twentieth century and that we increasingly perceive to be one of the only 
ones that does not turn away from either the afflictions or the revolts of 
modernity. 
Perhaps it is necessary to recall some of the paradoxical logics of the 
analytical cure to highlight the type of intimacy that analytical experience 
has brought to light, as modern art has, though by entirely different means. 
Recall the unprecedented timelessness (Zeit-los), which no philosophy 
had identified before him. It does not characterize mystical nunc stans but 
the temporality of the unconscious. While human existence is intrinsically 
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linked to time, the analytical experience reconciles us with this timelessness, 
which is that of the drives, and more particularly, of the death drive. Unlike 
any other translation or deciphering of signs, analytical interpretation 
emerges as a secular version of “forgiveness”, in which I see not just a 
suspension of judgment but a giving of meaning beyond judgment, within 
transference and counter-transference. 
Through timelessness and the revision of judgment, the analytical 
experience leads us to the borders of thought. Venturing into these regions is 
of interest to the philosopher as well as to the moralist, since the 
examination of thought (what is a thought, without time or without 
judgment?) implies an examination of judgment, of morality, and, 
ultimately, of the social bond. 
Of particular interest are the aesthetic or literary variants of 
timelessness and forgiveness that the analytical experience reveals. In short, 
with timelessness and forgiveness we are able to revisit nothing less than 
our intimate depths, which appear to us as the experience of suffering. Is it 
not true that the various forms of “possession” of our intimacy, including 
the most demonic and most tragic, remain our refuge and our resistance in 
the face of a so-called “virtual” world where judgments are blurred or 
assume an archaic and barbarous form? It is precisely in imaginary 
experience, particularly in literature, that this intimacy is deployed, with its 
timelessness in its strange forgiveness. 
Am I essentially pleading the case of intimate revolt as the only possible 
form of revolt? I am aware of the commercial dead-ends and spectacular 
quagmires of all the imaginary productions in which our rebellious intimacy 
manifests itself. There are periods when even the mystical path – this 
acceleration of libertarian transformations – is confined within treatments of 
pathology or else within spiritualist or decorative ghettos. This is one of 
those periods. 
 Faced with the invasion of the spectacle, we can still contemplate the 
rebellious potentialities that the imaginary can revive in our innermost 
depths. This is perhaps not yet a time of great works, or perhaps, for we 
contemporaries, they are underway but remain invisible. Nevertheless, by 
keeping our intimacy in revolt we can preserve the possibility of their 
appearance. 
The Need to Believe and the Desire to Know  
I have made reference to psychoanalysis above, but the revolt that seeks 
rebirth and constitutes the psychical life of analysands is not far removed 
from what every person feels when listening to his or her “inner self.” 
Traversed by complex logics, two of its movements are familiar to you all: 
the need to believe and the desire to know.5   
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The Oceanic Feeling…. 
   Two psychical experiences confront the clinician with the need to 
believe. The first refers to what Freud, in responding to Romain Rolland, 
describes not without reluctance as the “oceanic feeling” in Civilization and 
its Discontents. This has to do with the intimate union between the Ego and 
the surrounding world. It is experienced as an absolute certainty of 
satisfaction and security as well as a loss of oneself in favor of that which 
surrounds and contains us, in favor of a container. This alludes to the 
experience of the infant that has not yet established borders between his or 
her Ego and the maternal body. Indisputable and indivisible, this experience 
is given only to “some” whose “regression can go far enough.” Yet, Freud 
authenticates it as an original experience of the Ego. This pre- or trans-
linguistic experience, dominated by sensation, is at the heart of belief. It is 
belief not in the sense of a supposition but of an unshakeable certainty. It is a 
sensorial plenitude and ultimate truth that the subject experiences as an 
excessive —both sensorial and mental, and strictly speaking, ek-static —
over- or super-life. Certain aesthetic works provide evidence of this, and I 
have recognized it quite particularly in the work of Proust. The narrator 
mentions dreams without imagery (“the dream of the second apartment”) 
interwoven with pleasures and pains that “we believe” (as he specifies) 
unnameable. They draw upon the extreme intensity of the five senses and 
only a cascade of metaphors can attempt to “translate” them. The story of 
these dreams may be interpreted as a triumph over the endogenous autism 
that resides in our unconscious depths, as the psychoanalyst Frances Tustin 
would see it. Is the writer, then, the one who is able to succeed where the 
autist fails? 
The Psychoanalytic Approach to Believing and Knowing 
Let us take Psalm 116:10: “He' emanti ki adaber...” “My trust does not fail 
even when I say, ‘I am completely wretched.  In my terror I said, ‘No human 
being can be relied on.’” Echoing Psalm 116, Saint Paul in his Second Letter to 
the Corinthians 4:13 said, “Epistevsa dio elalisa” (in Greek), “Credidi, propter 
locutus sum” (in Latin), “I believed and therefore I have spoken” (in English). 
A few lines before, the psalmist evokes God’s merciful ear (“I love the Lord 
because he hath heard my voice and my supplications…”), the loving Other, 
and collects the many interpretations of the Hebrew word “ki” (“and”, 
“because”, “despite”). 
I understand the verse as follows: “Because You speak to me and listen 
to me, I believe and I speak, despite the unnamable.” The context of the 
psalm is more explicit: it is associated with faith (“emuna” in which we hear the 
root “amen,” faith or belief) which fills the statement with specific, indifferent 
and, even, deceptive meanings. Faith holds the key to the act of speech itself, 
even when it expresses a complaint (“I’m unhappy,” “people lie to me,” 
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etc.).  Because I believe, I speak. I wouldn’t speak if I didn’t believe. To 
believe what I say and to continue to say it grows out of the capacity to 
believe in the Other and not from inevitably disappointing existential 
experience.  But what is the nature of this “belief?”  
The Latin credo comes from the Sanskrit “kredh/sraddhà” which denotes 
an act of “confidence” in a God, involving restitution in the form of a divine 
favor accorded to the faithful. It is from this root that the financial term 
“credit” was derived; I set down a good and await my pay.  
The psychoanalytical experiences of the child and the adult attest to two 
crucial moments of development where the infans projects himself onto an 
outsider with whom he identifies: the loving father. On the one hand, there 
is the “oceanic feeling” of losing oneself in the maternal envelope, but also of 
infinitely likening oneself to the carrier wave of her protection. Isn’t this 
what the believer feels in the grace of communion with the Divine, and that 
Romain Rolland asked Freud to interpret? On the other hand, and closer to 
our questioning of the paternal role in the religious connection, let us recall 
what Freud calls a “primary identification.” This primary identification with 
the father of individual prehistory is the dawning of the symbolic outsider 
who replaces the fascination and the horror of the dual interdependence of 
the mother and child.6 This confident recognition is offered by the father-
who-loves-the-mother and is loved by her, and I in turn devote myself to 
him. This changes my stammering into linguistic signs, whose value he 
determines.  
Although these are signs of objects, they are mostly signs of my 
jubilations and my fears, of my early years of life. Spoken words transform 
my angst into “a believing expectation”: Gläubige Erwartung, wrote Freud7. 
Loving paternal listening gives meaning to what would otherwise be an 
inexpressible trauma, a nameless excess of pleasure and pain. But I do not 
construct this primary identification, nor does the loving father who 
imposes it on me. The primary identification is “direct and immediate,” like 
lightning or a hallucination.  It is through the father-loving mother’s 
sensitivity and discourse — a mother to whom I still belong and remain 
inseparable — that this “unification” of myself-in-another-who-is-an-
outsider is imprinted in me and structures me. 
Before Laius (the Oedipal father), the imaginary father recognizes me 
and loves me through the mother. This lets me know that I am not her but 
other and makes me believe that I can “believe.” Freud uses the word 
“cathexis” (Besetzung).  To believe and/or to cathect, not in him as the 
“object” of need or desire, but in his representation of me and in his words — 
in the representation that I make of him and in my words. “I believed and 
therefore I spoke.”   
On this foundation alone, my need to believe is thus satisfied and offers 
me optimal conditions for language acquisition. This can be accompanied by 
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another capacity that is both corrosive and liberating: the desire to know.  
Carried by this faith that lets me hear a loving/loved outsider, I burst into 
questions. 
Who hasn’t witnessed the pleasurable trance of a child asking 
questions? Still straddling the border between the flesh of the world and the 
kingdom of language, the child knows with a hallucinatory knowledge that 
all identity — object, person, himself, the adult’s response — is a 
constructible-deconstructible chimera. Lacan thought that the motto for 
psychoanalysis should be “Scilicet”: “you can know.” He forgot to mention 
that “you can know,” if and only if you believe you can know. From 
knowing to believing, and vice versa, such is the eternal turnstile of speaking-
being (parlêtre). 
Adolescence: A Syndrome of Ideality 
Whereas the child is a polymorphic pervert according to Freud who 
wants to know where babies come from and who Freud compares to a 
“laboratory researcher,” the adolescent is a believer. The adolescent is not a 
“researcher” in a laboratory but a believer. We are all adolescents when we are 
enthralled by the absolute.  Freud did not preoccupy himself with 
adolescents because he was himself a firm non-believer, perhaps the most 
irreligious person who ever existed.  Faith implies a passion for what 
psychoanalysis calls an “object relation”: faith is potentially fundamentalist, 
as is the adolescent. Romeo and Juliet are excellent examples of this. 
However, because the sadomasochistic nature of our drives and desires is 
inevitable, adolescent belief in the existence of the Ideal Object is constantly 
threatened. 
I will assert, then, that the adolescent is a believer in the object relation and/or 
of its impossibility.  Thus formulated, the question implies a parameter that is 
hard to take seriously: this parameter is ideality. 
What is the ideality syndrome? The adolescent Oedipal complex is 
violent because it operates on the carrier wave of idealization.  The 
adolescent whose psyche is rooted in the polymorphous perversity of the 
young child separates from the parental couple and replaces it with a new 
model.  In so doing, the narcissism of the Ego, tied up with its ideals, 
overflows the object and gives way to the amorous passion specific to the 
drive-ideality connection. 
The intensity of this new satisfaction is procured thanks to something 
not sufficiently brought out in Freudian theory. The inclusion of the object in 
narcissism happens in the guise of belief. The adolescent acquires the 
certainty that there is an absolute satisfaction. This is the certainty that he or 
she can erase the original and tragic Oedipus complex and rush towards a 
new love that will open the door to new paradises.  Images, ideologies, 
different forms of knowledge, and existential models are all brought into 
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play to shore up an idealized narcissism which unfolds over others and 
which surpasses all former ideals in strength. Ideality dominates the 
adolescent unconscious: adolescent drives and pleasure are structured not 
only as a language but also as an ideality.  
Let me sum this up as follows. The belief that an ideal object exists (be it 
a partner, a profession, or a creation) is accompanied by the absolute belief 
that the parental couple must be surpassed and even abolished so that the 
adolescent subject can escape into an idealized, paradisiacal form of absolute 
satisfaction. The Judeo-Christian paradise is an adolescent creation. The 
adolescent takes pleasure in the paradise syndrome, which conversely, can 
also become a source of suffering if absolute ideality turns into cruel 
persecution.  Because the adolescent believes that the other, surpassing the 
parental other, not only exists but provides absolute satisfaction, the 
adolescent believes that the Great Other — God — exists and is pleasure. 
The slightest disappointment of this ideality syndrome ruins paradise and 
leads toward delinquent conduct. 
Believers and Nihilists  
Insofar as adolescence is structured by idealization, we understand that 
it constitutes the malady of ideality. Either the adolescent lacks ideality or in 
a given context his or her ideality fails to adapt to the post-puberty drive 
and thus to the need to share with an absolutely satisfying object. 
Adolescent ideality is necessarily demanding and in a state of crisis, since 
the drive-ideality connection is constantly at risk of disintegration. 
Adolescent belief inexorably mixes with adolescent nihilism.  Why? Because 
it exists (in the unconscious), yet “he” or “she” disappoints me (in reality). I 
have no choice but to be angry with “them” and seek revenge: vandalism is 
what follows.  Or, because it exists  (in the unconscious), yet “he” or “she” 
disappoints me. I have no choice but to take it out on myself: self-mutilation 
and self-destructive behavior follows.  
Drug addiction thus abolishes consciousness but the experience of 
hallucinatory pleasure satisfies the belief in the absolute of orgasmic 
regression. Anorexic behavior breaks with the maternal line and reveals the 
young woman’s battle against femininity. Yet, this is to the benefit of an 
over-investment of the “hard-lined” body, which echoes back to the fantasy 
of absolute spirituality.  Through this fantasy, the entire body disappears in 
a beyond that is laden with paternal connotations.   
It is here that the analyst gets caught. For, many tend to stop at the 
erotic or thanatic symptom forgetting ideality, which controls the symptom 
from the unconscious.  But, how do we take into account the fact that the 
unconscious of the adolescent believer is constructed as a high-risk ideality?  
Civilizations commonly referred to as primitive have long used 
initiation rites to assert symbolic authority (divine for the invisible world, 
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political for this world here) and to justify the acting out of what we would 
qualify today as perverse by condoning initiatory sexual practices. In our 
own Western culture, notably in medieval Christianity, mortification rituals 
and excessive fasting channeled the anorexic and sadomasochistic behaviors 
of adolescents. In so doing, they either downplayed or glorified them.   
In yet another secular way, what seems to me to be an imaginary 
elaboration of the adolescent crisis is the birth of the European novel shaped 
around the adolescent character.8  The young page serving his Lady is a 
recurrent trope of courtly love in which a complex range of homosexual 
relations, more or less fully developed, are played out. Does psychoanalysis 
innovate, and if so, how does it avoid the pitfall of stabilizing the couple in 
marriage, that temporary happy ending of the bourgeois novel?  Even today, 
popular literature continues to draw from the narrative logic developed in 
the Renaissance. Even hard-core sex fails to break out of this logic and is 
easily assimilated into it 
Compared to the various ways of dealing with adolescents that have 
preceded us, we might wonder whether psychoanalysis, with its emphasis 
on attentive listening, is innovative. And if so, how? It is the analyst’s job to 
listen to the adolescent’s need to believe and to confirm it. If adolescents 
come to us, it is because they need us to recognize their ideality syndrome.  
We must articulate and share our understanding of it, if we are to 
comprehend and accurately interpret the delinquent behavior of the 
adolescent in crisis as a source of extreme jouissance — simili-paradis. Only 
later should the analyst attempt to point out the negative aspects, the 
Oedipus or Orestes type revolt, of this behavior.  
In other words, only the analyst’s capacity to see the pleasure-seeking, 
idealizing course of adolescent drives will provide a credible and effective 
transference and thus metabolize the need to believe through the pleasure 
that comes with thinking, questioning, and analyzing.  Sharing the ideality 
syndrome of the adolescent allows the analyst to weaken the patient’s 
resistance and guide the adolescent through an analytical process against 
which the adolescent generally rebels.  
The religious need, which was replaced throughout the 20th century by 
ideological enthusiasm, served and continues to serve as a way to 
authenticate the ideality syndrome.  It is no coincidence that, alongside the 
adolescent malaise which so worries modern society (to the point of 
spending handsome sums to establish “youth centers/homes” for teenagers 
with great pomp), we see religion making a come-back, often in bastardized 
forms (sects) or with a fundamentalist twist (encouraging the death drive to 
shift into high gear in the name of an ideal). In this context, adolescence can 
perhaps be seen in terms of its possibilities, though this outlook is 
contingent on our ability to accompany the teenager’s need to believe that is 
coextensive with the impossibility of this belief.  In so doing, we would be 
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better able to interpret the forms of our civilization’s new malaise and this 
renaissance of the “need to believe.”  We ourselves share this need, since 
within us there is a perpetual adolescent. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, I would like to highlight the revolts we call the “suburban 
troubles,” which are especially felt in Marseille but elsewhere as well. Aren’t 
they due to a failure of the French model of secularism? In fact, the matter is 
more grave: we are below the level of the clash of religions. I think that the 
delinquency of “disadvantaged teens” reveals a more radical phase of 
nihilism. This delinquency concerns the deeper mechanisms of civilization 
and highlights the destruction of the pre-religious “need to believe” that 
constitutes the psychical life with and for others, on which I have sought to 
shed light today. 
Adolescent gangster fundamentalism has suddenly revealed that the 
religious treatment of revolt has lost credibility. It is insufficient to ensure 
the paradisiacal aspirations of the paradoxical believer, the nihilist believer – 
who is necessarily nihilist because pathetically idealistic – the disconnected, 
desocialized teenager in the ruthlessness of global migration. 
Psychoanalysis speaks to this deep disorganization of the self — 
unbound (the “I” doesn’t exist, “nothing but an unbinding drive ready to go 
to any extreme”) — and of the relationship to the other — to the point of de-
objectification (“the other has no meaning or value”) — where the death drive 
alone, the malignity of evil, triumphs. And so we find ourselves facing 
“radical evil” in a new way.  
What is radical evil? It consists of asserting – and realizing – the 
superfluity of human beings: their being sentenced to death (Kant, Arendt).  
Is radical evil “without reason”? Mysticism and literature both say so in 
their own ways. We — the political pact — cannot stop there. With the 
psychoanalytical experience, I do not remain content to revolt, and even less 
so against radical evil. I seek the logic of extreme evil so as to refine its 
interpretation in the transference-countertransference. We discover that, 
after familial disintegrations and social failures, some people — especially 
adolescents — succumb to the disease of ideality. They literally explode and 
become incapable of distinguishing good from evil, inside from outside, or 
subject from object. Of the two drives that exist within us — of life and of 
death — it is the death drive that absorbs their psychical life, sinks into blind 
destructiveness and finally self-destruction. The need to believe collapses 
within the empire of unbinding and de-objectification; this is accompanied 
by either a mad pleasure or the emptiness of apathy. 
Here, we must make an important distinction. Yes, there does exist an 
evil that comes from the clash of values. Values themselves are produced by 
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divergent or competing libidinal interests and underlie our conceptions of 
good and evil. Religious man and moral man are constituted of these: 
regardless of whether they are more or less guilty and enraged, they 
experience them, worry about them, and hope to elucidate them so that they 
can listen to one another rather than kill one another. 
In addition to this type of evil, however, there is an extreme evil, which 
sweeps away the meaning of the distinction between good and evil and 
thereby destroys the possibility of accessing the other’s existence, meaning, 
and self. These extreme states do not take refuge in hospitals or on the 
psychoanalyst’s couch, instead they unfold in socio-political catastrophes 
and in the abjection of exterminations such as the Holocaust, that horror 
which defies explanation and reason. But the new forms of extreme evil are 
spreading in a globalized world, in the wake of maladies of ideality. 
And it is from this diagnosis that the audacity of psychoanalytic care 
springs and seeks to be more than a “comprehensive moralism.” It places 
the analyst at the unsustainable intersection where this disobjectalisation-
objectalisation moves about threateningly, and yet can initiate a re-
structuring. This is our challenge, after the discovery of the death drive and 
the malignant potential of the psychic apparatus that dwells within its 
ability to produce maladies of ideality. These diseases of the soul destroy 
both the need to believe and the desire to know, such that the human being 
is rendered incapable of investing himself and establishing relationships. 
Dispossessed of a “self” and lacking a sense of the other, one wanders 
aimlessly in the absence of a “world”, in a non-world with neither “good” 
nor “evil,” nor “value” of any kind. 
Is it possible to push analytical listening to the borders of Homo Sapiens 
and to continue practicing psychoanalysis in these conditions? The French 
Republic is facing a historic challenge. Will it be able to confront this crisis of 
the need to believe and the desire to know, which is no longer contained by 
the lid of religion and which touches the very depths of the bond between 
human beings? The anguish paralyzing the country in these times of excess 
and against the backdrop of economic and social crisis expresses our 
incertitude before this colossal issue. Can we mobilize all of our resources —
police and economic, not to mention those which give us knowledge of souls 
— to care for the harrowing malady of ideality that is engulfing us and 
which is expressed by adolescents from good neighborhoods and even more 
so in lawless areas? Can we care for them with the necessary delicacy and 
attentiveness, with an appropriate education and with the needed 
generosity? Interpreted as such, the “crisis of the youth” who call out for 
God and who are beset by the malignancy of evil cannot not concern us. 
I have attempted to tell you how much it concerns me. Am I optimistic? 
Perhaps too optimistic? I would define myself rather as an energetic 
pessimist who appreciates only an active intelligence in thought, or the 
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timeliness of intelligence. And so I ask: What is one to do? What are we to 
do? To quote Nietzsche: “Put a big question mark in the place of heavy 
seriousness,” that is, in God’s place. “Transvalue” (Umwertung aller werte) 
values, passions, needs to believe and desires to know. Do not give up in 
face of evil, not even in face of extreme evil. But patiently pursue the search 
— certainly not for who knows what utopian balance, but rather the search 
for a path to that fragile point described by Pascal: “Whosoever would find 
the secret of rejoicing in the good without troubling himself with its contrary 
evil would have hit the point. It is perpetual motion.” And what if the revolt 
we lack today is precisely this “point”, this “perpetual motion”, toward the 
“secret of rejoicing in the good without troubling oneself with its contrary 
evil”? What if it is a certain inner experience? 
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